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WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA. By 
Marylynn Salmon. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 267. $24. 
Prior to the passage of the first married women's property acts in 
the mid-nineteenth century, 1 single women enjoyed much the same 
property rights as men,2 but "wives exercised only a truncated propri-
1. The first state to pass such an act was Mississippi in 1839. See Comment, Husband and 
Wife: Mef!lorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1110 (1944). 
2. 'Notable exceptions included women's inability to enjoy the franchise associated with prop-
erty ownership in early America, to inherit equally with their brothers due to the law of primo-
geniture (observed in New York until 1774, in Virginia until 1785, in Maryland until 1786, and 
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etary capacity" (p. xv). Once married, women were no longer individ-
uals with respect to the law. They could not institute legal actions, 
enter into binding contracts, act as executors or administrators of es-
tates or as legal guardians, or convey property without their husbands' 
participation.3 The common law sanctioned these activities only when 
wives acted with their husbands. Conversely, men did not require 
their wives' consent or participation for most transactions. Thus, in 
many respects the legal relationship between husband and wife resem-
bled that between guardian and incompetent.4 
The married women's property acts removed many of these com-
mon law disabilities of married women. The acts generally provided 
that married women shall have the same rights as single women to sue 
and be sued, make contracts, and own and transfer property.5 By thus 
equalizing the property rights of married and single women, the acts 
displaced the ancient legal fiction of unity of person, whereby a hus-
band and wife were viewed as a special partnership in which the wife's 
role was submissive (pp. 14-15). Those states that passed such acts at 
last cleaved the married couple into individuals and recognized the 
possibility of separate interests within a marriage. 
Traditionally, historians have characterized the married women's 
property acts as revolutionary, the products of profound economic 
changes accompanying industrialization. 6 In Women and the Law of 
Property in Early America, however, Marylynn Salmon7 moves beyond 
this perspective and shows that the passage of these acts was evolu-
tionary, not revolutionary. She also asserts that, while economic 
forces may have dictated the need for legal reforms, ideological and 
social forces - not economic ones - determined whether those re-
forms would spell increased autonomy for women or perpetuate their 
dependence (p. 190). 
From 1750 to 1830 an agonizingly slow and by no means uniform 
expansion in married women's property rights is evident. Because this 
expansion effectively foreshadows the more dramatic and substantive 
gains embodied in the married women's property acts, Salmon chooses 
to assess the legal status of married women during this period, explain 
in South Carolina until 1791 (p. 142)), and, of course, to expand their property rights upon 
marriage. 
3. Under common Jaw, a husband was even held liable for his wife's torts. This rule was 
based on the presumption that a wife acts under her husband's direction. See I. DUKEMINIER & 
1. KRIER, PROPERTY 531 n.13 (1981). 
4. Id. at 531. 
5. C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 559, 
644-47 (2d ed. 1983). 
6. For a listing and brief discussion of studies representing the debate on the development of 
women's property rights in colonial and early American society, see pp. xii-xvii nn.4-6. 
7. Salmon is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore 
County. The book is based on her Ph.D. thesis. 
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regional variations in this status, and show that the ideological and 
social forces which later resulted in passage of the married women's 
property acts were rooted in late colonial and early national society. 
Women and the Law of Property in Early America succeeds admi-
rably in these aims. In part, this success is due to Salmon's methodol-
ogy. By choosing seven colonies (later states) to represent a range of 
social and economic characteristics of the period and by examining the 
legal status of married women in each with respect to conveyances, 
contracts, divorce and separation, separate estates, and provisions for 
widows, Salmon claims to avoid the flaws of past studies. Past studies, 
she asserts, have "suffered from a failure to cast the net widely 
enough" and have resorted to "easy generalizations" (p. 185). By fail-
ing to look at a number of different colonies and states, these studies 
give the mistaken impression that early America treated married 
women uniformly and that the married women's property acts materi-
alized suddenly from a nationwide consensus. Furthermore, by failing 
to examine several types of property transactions, such studies may 
also lead one to the erroneous conclusion that a given colony or state 
can be easily characterized as either liberal or repressive in its treat-
ment of women. With the appearance of Salmon's careful, extensively 
footnoted analysis of statutes, case law, and writings of the period, 
however, such misimpressions must now be put aside. 
Salmon first discusses the vast regional variations in married 
women's legal status. In Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania - the colonies Salmon chooses to exemplify the reform tradi-
tion - Puritan and Quaker legislators, having fled religious 
persecution in England, were not enamored of English norms and dis-
trusted the flexible modes of adjudication employed in English chan-
cery courts. Thus, they were not at all reluctant to break with 
England to create social and legal systems that exemplified their ide-
als. One such ideal, deeply rooted in both the Puritan and Quaker 
ethoses, was that of family unity, which required the wife's submission 
to her husband's will in all aspects of economic life. To strengthen the 
family unit, therefore, lawmakers reduced the autonomy of married 
women. In doing so, they were unconstrained by more liberal deci-
sions emanating from English chancery courts or by any consideration 
of whether the end of family unity justified the means of enforcing 
women's submission. 
To Salmon, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina represent 
slave economies. Settled by adventurers and entrepreneurs rather than 
by social experimenters and reformers, these colonies imitated English 
social and legal norms in an attempt to preserve the self-esteem of 
colonists who viewed the culture of the mother country as superior. 
These colonies therefore lacked the ideological commitment to change 
that characterized their Puritan and Quaker neighbors to the north. 
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As a result, chancery jurisprudence was embraced and English prece-
dents were followed, adapted only to the exigencies of the new world. 
Finally, Salmon chooses to analyze New York, a colony that is 
harder to classify. Founded by entrepreneurs and adventurers akin to 
those who settled the South (p. 12), New York, like the southern colo-
nies, had many laws which attempted to duplicate the common law 
and equity systems of England. New York's economy, however, was 
more like that of the New England colonies. Thus, despite the com-
mon English origin, New York law came to be distinct from the law of 
the southern colonies due to its application and adaptation to a differ-
ent economic reality. 
Having first distinguished the social reformers in New England 
and Pennsylvania from the England-gazing Southerners and New 
Yorkers, Salmon then traces the development of laws on conveyanc-
ing. Under common law, upon marriage a husband acquired an estate 
known as jure uxoris, which gave him the right to possession (includ-
ing all rents and profits) of lands of which his wife was seised either 
before or during the marriage. While the wife retained legal title to 
this property, the rights embodied in the estatejure uxoris were aliena-
ble by the husband and subject to the reach of his creditors. 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania all created convey-
ancing laws based on the assumption that family stability required the 
wife to be submissive and that a husband's judgment would always be 
exercised in the best interests of the family. Thus, the Puritans and 
Quakers rejected such legal conventions as the bargain and sale deed 
with a private examination as a method of conveying married women's 
property. Under this mechanism, the wife was examined in private by 
a judge to insure that her signature on a deed conveying her own lands 
was knowingly given and free from coercion (pp. 17-18). This proce-
dure, implying as it did the wife's autonomous decision regarding the 
disposition of property, represented a threat to the Puritans' and 
Quakers' concept of family harmony. The "reformers" thus invoked 
the concept of unity of person to reduce this threat, but as Salmon 
astutely notes, "Unity of person was based on the perfect marriage, 
and therefore it inevitably created hardships in marriages that were 
less than ideal" (p. 15). Thus, the reality of self-serving, coercive hus-
bands was not recognized, and the damage they wreaked on their 
wives' fortunes was left unchecked. 
New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, on the other 
hand, accepted the concept of separate interests within marriage and 
admitted the strong possibility that a husband would coerce his wife to 
assent to transactions involving her property. They thus tended to en-
force private examinations. Salmon formulates two theories for this 
difference (pp. 39-40). The Puritans and Quakers may have been pro-
gressive because they left it to women to protect their own interests, 
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while the southern states were paternal because of their concern for 
female helplessness. The alternate theory is that New York and the 
southern states, by admitting the possibility of coercion and enforcing 
private examinations, were the more enlightened by being less willing 
to view women's submission within marriage as per se in the best in-
terests of the family. 
How women fared in reality cannot be assessed by focusing on 
only a single sphere of transactions. Thus, in addition to conveyanc-
ing, Salmon focuses on divorce and separation provisions. Surpris-
ingly, the Puritan colonies had the more liberal divorce laws. The 
Puritans viewed marriage not as a sacrament but as a civil contract 
and believed that "absolute divorces benefited society by dissolving ' 
dysfunctional unions" (p. 61). Absolute divorce was felt to be better 
for society than a marriage wherein opposing interests were permitted 
to clash. Thus, only in the New England colonies did lawmakers 
break from the traditional English reluctance to grant absolute di-
vorce, and Puritan women, at least, were not legally trapped in cruel, 
abusive, or tyrannical marriages. While divorce was not as easily ob-
tained in the southern colonies and New York, the chancery courts in 
these jurisdictions administered legal separations. This resource was 
not available to the reform colonies. 
Once married, women resorted to divorce and separation only in-
frequently, but "[the] legal subjugation of the wife was intolerable to 
many prospective wives and their fathers."8 Thus, where equity juris-
diction existed, the lawyer's office was a frequent stop on the way to 
the altar. Here, women sought to create property rights as yet unrec-
ognized in common law and which could be enforced only in chancery 
courts. The mechanisms they created and sought to enforce included: 
premarital contracts which gave exclusive control of certain property 
to the wife during the marriage; "separate estate[s] in equity" (trusts, 
set up by the wife's family, of which she was the sole beneficiary); and 
mandatory contractual agreements between husband and wife 
whereby part of his estatejure uxoris was pledged to the support of the 
wife and could not be conveyed by him.9 
Over time, the flexibility of the chancery courts and their use of 
English precedent allowed states with separate equity jurisdiction to 
enforce separate estates and antenuptial contracts for women and 
thereby protect wives' property from their husbands' creditors. The 
law in those states, according to Salmon, evolved to protect married 
women "as the financial prospects of their husbands became increas-
ingly unstable" (p. 83). 
On the other hand, neither Massachusetts nor Connecticut en-
forced separate estates, and the single most important reason for this 
8. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 3, at 531. 
9. Id. 
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failure was the absence of chancery courts in these jurisdictions (p. 
120). The Puritans' aversion to equity courts caused them to create a 
"truncated equity jurisdiction" (p. 121) which incorporated, piece by 
piece, certain claims and causes of action into their common law 
courts. Salmon documents how this piecemeal approach, combined 
with an ideology which viewed a woman's autonomy as threatening to 
the family, shaped the law regarding separate trust estates. 
Finally, Salmon deals at length with economic provisions for wid-
ows. Because of the pervasive system of enforced dependency docu-
mented elsewhere in the book, this was a pressing concern for women. 
Once a woman's source of support had vanished, it was crucial that 
the law provide her enough of her husband's property to maintain a 
decent lifestyle. Salmon shows just how inadequately the law met this 
need. 
The traditional provision of dower, a life interest in one-third of 
the real property owned by the husband during any time in the mar-
riage, was both an absolute right and a floor below which any alternate 
provisions for the widow - including testamentary provisions -
could not fall. So inviolate was the right to dower that it prompted 
one jurist in 1810 to declare: "the common by-word in the law [is] 
that the law favors three things, life, liberty, and dower" (p. 145). As 
a life interest only, however, dower did not give the widow the right to 
alienate the property she received, but only to enjoy its rent and profits 
for her lifetime. On her death, it descended automatically to her hus-
band's children. Thus, dower reflected an ideal in colonial thought: it 
provided immediate support to the widow but did not allow for her 
independence (p. 143). 
Perhaps more than any other area of the law, the rules of inheri-
tance were subject to regional variations. Social, demographic, and 
economic conditions of the earliest colonial settlements laid the foun-
dation for these differences. The early plantation societies suffered 
from high mortality rates, and men often died young, leaving behind 
young widows with children. Unless slaves and personal property 
were included in dower, these widows would be unable to manage the 
plantation, and their share of their husbands' real property would be 
meaningless, as no profits could flow from its use. In New England, 
however, the presence of slaves was not a factor in the development of 
inheritance provisions. New England widows, older and more likely 
to have grown children than those in the plantation societies, were 
expected to rely on their children for support. The Puritan ideal of 
family unity and interdependence reinforced this expectation. Thus, 
their dower consisted of only real property. Once again, however, re-
ality conflicted with ideals to the detriment of women in less than ideal 
family situations, and the reality of this forced dependence was 
shocking: 
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Far too often impoverished widows without family connections sim-
ply could not get along. They needed public assistance. In many com-
munities, widows and single women living alone constituted the largest 
segment of recipients of poor relief. They turned up in almshouses as 
well. [p. 184] 
The enforced dependency of widows (p. 183) on the charity of their 
children, families, and community was inevitable because the law de-
nied widows the property and the control over it they needed to main-
tain their standard of living once their husbands died. 
Salmon ends her analysis of statutes, case law, and writings by not-
ing that women's dissatisfaction with the scheme of property rights 
men had provided them began to express itself in a variety of ways by 
the end of the period from 1750 to 1830. Demonstrations of their dis-
content ranged from refusals to marry to insistence on premarital con-
tracts to resort to equitable mechanisms to create and enforce separate 
estates. By the middle of the nineteenth century, significant numbers 
of women were pressing for passage of the married women's property 
acts and for inheritance reforms that would increase their financial 
independence. Finally, Salmon foreshadows women's monumental 
drive for that most fundamental "compliance with the ideals of the 
Revolution" (p. 193), the vote. 
Thus, the complexity of married women's property rights during 
the late colonial and early national periods becomes clear: legal de-
vices available to women in some colonies and states were not avail-
able to their sisters in others. Colonial ideology created a diverse, 
often paradoxical scheme of statutes and case law, at once liberal and 
conservative, progressive and regressive, egalitarian and patriarchal. 
It is a tribute to Marylynn Salmon's research and analysis that this 
book is often frustrating and infuriating to read. On one level this is 
because the development of the law was so painfully slow. Old legal 
concepts such as unity of person died hard - impeding expansions in 
women's autonomy that were otherwise consistent with the changing 
American economy, changing attitudes toward women, and the ma-
turing of republican ideals by the mid-nineteenth century. On another 
level, the book is frustrating because the values Salmon documents are 
so objectionable to present-day notions of women's role in society, and 
it is easy to lose patience with ideas so rooted in ignorance and chau-
vinism and with theories that deny people the basic dignity of being 
treated as individuals. 
This book will likely prove an important contribution to the fields 
of social and legal history and women's studies as a whole. It will also 
be interesting to see how more judgmental historians will use the injus-
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tices Salmon documents to judge our colonial forefathers and religious 
patriarchs. 
- David H. Bromfield 
